Commentary on Menninghaus et al. 2017
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George Ainslie
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville PA, USA
University of Cape Town, South Africa
George.Ainslie@va.gov
Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40, 2017
“Negative” emotions are never purely negative. They attract attention at the very least, and often stay attractive enough to make rehearsing them an addictive activity. As the authors point out, they also counteract a relentless tendency for positive emotions to become boring. Analysis in terms of reward suggests why this tendency occurs and how symbiosis with negative emotions may arise, in art and in life.
The authors ask why negative emotions are “central in art reception far beyond tragedy” (Abstract). They catalog eight mechanisms by which painful affect increases pleasure, but their hypotheses rest basically on two: making-the-pain-not-so-bad (art context, mere representation, and fiction)—which does not speak to the change of valence—and mixing-pain-and-pleasure, the positive effect of which is itself what they promised to explain (Section 1). The other “embracing” phenomena—aesthetic virtues, meaning construction, and genre scripts—are beside their main quest for what turns the negative into the positive.
The target article asked why negative emotions are “central in art reception far beyond tragedy.” (Menninghaus et.al., 2017) Among other hypotheses the authors described the process of mixing-pain-and-pleasure, for which they described an incentive but not a mechanism. [added July 3, 2019]
This quest should reach well beyond the realm of art. Why are negative emotions central to the pursuit of pleasure generally? To the extent that the world does not impose painful feelings on us, why are we moved to seek them? The authors’ core hypothesis about “aesthetic processing” is that “the pleasure taken in the beautiful representation of wholly positive and beautiful objects and narratives tends to be less intense, profound, and self-supportive and more prone to induce boredom than pleasure that includes a dynamic interplay of positive and negative emotional responses” (Section 4.1). As in art, so in life. People often seek the adjuvant effect of negativity, for instance in gambling despite a conscious expectation of loss, masochistic relationships, painful sex, and endurance sports. Many apparent pains maintain behaviors over long periods, such as prolonged grieving, nursing grudges, and following disaster-oriented news sources. And these are just cases in which a distinct negative component makes the question of rationality obvious.
In many more ways people court obstacles, defeats, and challenges while concealing from themselves that they are doing so (Ainslie, 2013). Conventional utility theory requires that we set long term goals and defend them from risky, “impulsive” distractions, but we have been warned that such policies may disappoint us. Emotion researcher Sylvan Tomkins noted: “The paradox is that it is just those achievements which are most solid, which work best, and which continue to work that excite and reward us least. The price of skill is the loss of the experience of value-- and of the zest for living” (1978, p. 212). Konrad Lorenz described the result of living in leisure: “The whole glorious amplitude of the waves of human emotions, all that makes life worth living-- is dampened down to a scarcely perceptible oscillation between scarcely perceptible tiny displeasures and pleasures. The result is an immeasurable boredom” (1970, pp. 355-6). A prosperous society has to choose involvements the way it chooses art—finding “a dynamic interplay between positive and negative emotional responses.”
So the negative is partly positive, but what properties does this imply? I propose a reward-based analysis to reconcile the sometime positive effect of negative emotions with utility theory. Like the authors, I put aside “functional benefits” (Section 1c) and deal entirely with differential motivation.
1. People in whom this does not happen as much become absorbed in imagination—are “fantasy prone” (Rhue & Lynn, 1987).
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Ainslie, George (2017) De gustibus disputare: Hyperbolic delay discounting integrates five approaches to choice. Journal of Economic Methodology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2017.1309748
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